



T he doctrine of finality has recently been under steady attack.It has erected a high hurdle for individuals to overcome
before their convictions can be overturned or their sentences
modified, even if those individuals may be innocent, have been
improperly sentenced, or are serving substantively
disproportionate sentences. New science and changing societal
views, though, have impelled commentators to take another look
at the age-old doctrine of finality. In their reassessments,
commentators have often disregarded or given little weight to the
interests long thought to buttress the doctrine. And they have
been quick to argue that the doctrine of finality must be
abandoned, or at least relaxed, to provide courts with the
opportunity to remedy injustices such as wrongful convictions and
unjust sentences.
Commentators' rush to embrace new ideas and set aside
obstacles like the finality doctrine is reminiscent of commentators'
adoption of similar new ideas during the middle of the last
century.' This was the era during which the penological theory of
rehabilitation proliferated as policymakers acted on new science
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1. See Meghan J. Ryan, Science and the New Rehabilitation 7-10 (May 13, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2019368
[hereinafter Ryan, Science and Rehabilitation].
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and seemingly enlightened views about sentencing.2 This same
sense of enlightenment is now, again, beginning to spread
through the policymaking arena.
Today, rehabilitation and the discard of finality are often
thought of as complementary; they are both avenues-and
perhaps the same avenue-to more enlightened approaches to
punishment. But the relationship between finality and
rehabilitation is actually more complicated. Finality has historically
been understood as promoting rehabilitation. More recently,
however, finality has been said to undercut rehabilitative efforts.
This seeming inconsistency stems from changing understandings
of rehabilitation over the years, therefore examining divergent
conceptions of rehabilitation is necessary to deciphering its
relationship with finality.
Rehabilitation focuses on offender change-on whether an
offender is a final product or, rather, whether he is capable of
transformation. This capacity for change might actually be
thought of in terms of a third class of finality: the finality of the
offender himself. If the offender is not final, meaning that he is
capable of change, then the type of possible change is important.
Is it character change-the type of rehabilitation referred to
during an earlier era?4 Or is it behavioral change-the conception
of rehabilitation frequently referenced today?5 While often
overlooked, examining the nature of the rehabilitation at issue is
critical to determining whether finality of conviction and
sentencing may promote or undercut an offender's rehabilitation.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF FINALITY
The doctrine of finality is somewhat difficult to
circumscribe. Black's Law Dictionary does not contain an entry for
the concept, and the Oxford English Dictionary fails to provide a
2. See id. at 8-10, 30.
3. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)
(" [F] inality serves the State's goal of rehabilitating those who commit crimes . . . .
4. See Ryan, Science and Rehabilitation, supra note 1, at 44-46.
5. Id. at 44-48.
6. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 705 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the "finality doctrine"
only as " [t] he rule that a court will not judicially review an administrative agency's action
until it is final," which is a somewhat different concept).
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legal definition. Not even judge Friendly's or Paul Bator's seminal
articles on the doctrine of finality clearly define the concept.8 But
the doctrine of finality is in some ways quite simple. Most often, it
refers to the notion that a legal judgment-whether that be a
judgment of conviction or of sentencing-should be considered
the last word on a matter once the courts have completed direct
review of the case, and the judgment then should not be revisited
by a court at any future time. The doctrine frequently comes into
play in determining whether a criminal defendant's attempt to
collaterally attack his conviction and sentence is appropriate. 9
Perhaps the most well-known face of finality is the finality
of convictions-the idea that judges ordinarily ought not to
question offenders' convictions that have completed the stages of
direct review. For example, in the infamous Herrera v. Collins'o
case, a petitioner who had been convicted of capital murder
sought federal habeas corpus relief, alleging that he was factually
7. See generally OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2009) (neglecting to provide
a legal definition).
8. See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (neglecting to clearly define the doctrine of
finality); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970) (same). It is important to note, though, that some courts and
scholars seem to have adopted broader and narrower understandings of "finality" than
used here.
9. It is important to note that procedures for collaterally attacking convictions and
sentences in federal court have changed dramatically since the enactment of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214. Under the Act, many federal defendants' claims that would previously have
been styled as petitions for writs of habeas corpus now take the form of a motion to
"vacate, set aside or correct [the defendant's] sentence" under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See
Janice L. Bergmann, Section 2255 Motions and Other Federal Postconviction Remedies § 1.01, in
SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENDING A CRIMINAL CASE (2010), available at http://www.rashkind.
com/appellatedocs.htm. The Supreme Court has explained that "§ 2255 was intended to
afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus." Davis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). This similarity between the two avenues for relief
has caused commentators to refer to § 2255 motions as petitions for habeas corpus. See,
e.g., Dustin B. Benham, Beyond Congress's Reach: Constitutional Aspects of Inherent Power, 43
SETON HALL L. REV. 75, 122 n.287 (2013) (equating applications for habeas corpus and §
2255 motions); Emily Garcia Uhrig, The Sacrifice of Unarmed Prisoners to Gladiators: The Post-
AEDPA Access-to-the-Courts Demand for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Habeas
Corpus, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1219, 1229 n.43 (2012) (noting AEDPA restrictions on
"federal inmates seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255"). For a good summary on
the interaction between habeas petitions and § 2255 motions, see generally Bergmann,
supra.
10. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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innocent of the crime for which he had been convicted." In
support of his innocence, the petitioner presented several
individuals' affidavits that claimed the petitioner's deceased
brother was actually the guilty party.12 Affirming the lower courts'
decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court denied relief, stating:
[B]ecause of the very disruptive effect that
entertaining claims of actual innocence would have
on the need for finality in capital cases, and the
enormous burden that having to retry cases based
on often stale evidence would place on the States,
the threshold showing for such an assumed right
would necessarily be extraordinarily high. The
showing made by petitioner in this case falls far
short of any such threshold."
Moreover, the Court explained that, even if the petitioner had
made out "a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual
innocence,"'14 the petitioner's claim still would have been
denied15 : Although federal habeas courts take into account claims
of actual innocence in determining whether a petitioner may be
excepted from procedural limitations on the writ for habeas
corpus,' 6 finality concerns compel federal habeas courts to refuse
to entertain freestanding actual innocence claims-innocence
claims that do not stand alongside claims of constitutional error.7
11. See id. at 393.
12. See id. at 396-97 & n.2. At the time petitioner filed his second federal habeas
petition, his brother was deceased. See id. at 396.
13. Id. at 417.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 399-417. The Herrera Court made it very clear that " [c]laims of actual
innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for
federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the
underlying state criminal proceeding." Id. at 400. Precedent indicates that such evidence
"is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus." Id. (quoting Townsend v. Sam, 372
U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (overruled on other grounds)) (emphasis omitted). " [O]ur habeas
jurisprudence makes clear," the Court stated, "that a claim of 'actual innocence' is not
itself a constitutional claim." Id. at 404.
16. See id. at 404.
17. See id. at 400, 404-05. Despite the majority's reasoning, six Justices in Herrera
suggested that executing an innocent individual would be unconstitutional. See id. at 419
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that it is a "fundamental legal principle that
executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution"); id. at 429 (White, J.,
concurring) ("I assume that a persuasive showing of 'actual innocence' made after trial,
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This powerful doctrine of finality that could potentially
allow the government to execute an innocent person'8 is said to
serve many interests. First, the principle of finality serves the
government's "punitive interests."19 If a court revisits and vacates a
defendant's conviction, it might be difficult for the government to
retry the defendant.20 This is not necessarily because the
defendant is innocent, but the deck will likely be stacked against
the government because evidence may have disappeared between
the time of the first trial and the time that the government needs
to retry the defendant.2 ' During this period, witnesses' memories
may have faded and physical evidence may have degraded, or
been misplaced or destroyed.2 2 The principle of finality is also
useful in supporting the deterrence value of criminal statutes.23 If
courts readily revisit offenders' convictions on collateral attack,
then would-be offenders may be less certain that they will be swiftly
even though made after the expiration of the time provided by law for the presentation of
newly discovered evidence, would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in
this case."); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Nothing could be more contrary to
contemporary standards of decency, or more shocking to the conscience, than to execute
a person who is actually innocent." (internal citations omitted)). Further, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy contended that " [n]owhere does the [majority] state that the
Constitution permits the execution of an actually innocent person." Id. at 427 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
18. See supra text accompanying notes 10-17. Several commentators have alleged
instances of such wrongful executions. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 72 (1987) (alleging
twenty-three cases of wrongful execution); see also Meghan J. Ryan, Remedying Wrongful
Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 264-73 & nn.85-86 (2012) [hereinafter Ryan,
Wrongful Execution] (describing a case of possible wrongful execution that took place in
Texas in 2004 and also explaining that "no individual executed in the United States has
been formally legally exonerated").
19. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
20. See id.; Ryan, Wrongful Execution, supra note 18, at 277; William A. Schroeder,
Federal Habeas Review ofState Prisoner Claims Based on Alleged Violations ofProphylactic Rules of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure: Reviving and Extending Stone v. Powell, 60 U. KAN. L. REV.
231, 276 (2011).
21. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403 ("[T]he passage of time only diminishes the
reliability of criminal adjudications."); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991)
(" [W] hen a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the erosion of memory
and dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time prejudice the government
and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication." (internal quotations and
citations omitted)); Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453 (Powell, J., concurring).
22. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453 (PowellJ., concurring).
23. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) ("Finality is essential to
both the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law."); Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 309 (1989) ("Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its
deterrent effect."); Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 452 (Powell, J., concurring).
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convicted, sentenced, and punished for the crimes they commit.24
Finality has also been said to further offender rehabilitation. 25 By
remaining firm on the matter of the offender's conviction, it
allows the offender to turn inward and begin working on himself
rather than continuing to focus on the fight to have his conviction
overturned.26 Finality also conserves governmental resources.27
Retrying a defendant requires the government to expend
significant capital, taxing the government both monetarily and in
terms of the time that prosecutors and judges must spend on the
case.28 Additionally, finality is said to provide victims with closure. 29
If courts revisit convictions that are supposedly final, and
especially if offenders must be retried, victims must, once again,
24. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 452-53 (Powell, J., concurring); see also CESARE
BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 58-59, 93-99 (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963)
(1794) (explaining that effective deterrence rides on the certainty of punishment, the
speed with which it is imposed, and its severity).
25. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Flinality serves the
State's goal of rehabilitating those who commit crimes because rehabilitation demands
that the convicted defendant realize that he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in
need of rehabilitation." (internal quotations and alterations omitted)); Engle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107, 126-27 nn.31-32 (1982) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring)); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring) ("At
some point the law must convey to those in custody that a wrong has been committed,
that consequent punishment has been imposed, that one should no longer look back with
the view to resurrecting every imaginable basis for further litigation but rather should
look forward to rehabilitation and to becoming a constructive citizen."); Sanders v.
United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Both the individual
criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that there will at some point
be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be
focused not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether the
prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community.").
26. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Engle, 456 U.S. at
127 (1982) (referencing Justice Harlan's statement that "both the ... defendant and
society have an interest in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that
comes with an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused not on
whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether the prisoner can be
restored to a useful place in the community").
27. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453 n.16 (Powell, J., concurring).
28. See id. Moreover, disregarding the finality doctrine could open the floodgates to
voluminous meritless, as well as costly, claims. See Margaret A. Berger, Lessons from DNA:
Restriking the Balance Between Finality and Justice, in DNA & THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM:
THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 109, 111 (David Lazer ed., 2004) [hereinafter DNA & THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM] ("Finality conserved scarce judicial time by not opening the
floodgates to meritless and costly claims.").
29. See Berger, supra note 28, at 111 (explaining finality's historical value in
promoting "needed closure for victims and their families and for participants in the legal
proceedings: witnesses, judicial officers, prosecutors, victims' rights advocates, and law
enforcement personnel").
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relive the crimes that were perpetrated against them.30 Lastly,
finality is said to preserve comity and federalism in certain
circumstances.31 States ought to retain their authority over state
criminal law, and any federal review of a state conviction creates
friction between the two sovereign entities that ought to be
avoided.32
The finality doctrine, and the interests finality is said to
serve, has been questioned in recent years, though.33 Much of this
questioning stems from flagging confidence in the certainty of
30. See id.
31. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998) ("Finality serves as well to
preserve the federal balance."). Often, the Supreme Court states that the interests
buttressing courts' conservative approaches to entertaining defendants' collateral attacks
are "comity, finality, and federalism." Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)
("Congress enacted AEDPA to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal
criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases, and 'to further the principles of comity,
finality, and federalism."' (internal citation omitted)); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420,
436 (2000) (noting that the purpose of AEDPA was to further the doctrines of "comity,
finality, and federalism" (internal citations omitted)). This suggests that perhaps finality is
not supporting federalism and comity but instead that federalism and comity are
additional interests to be taken into account alongside finality. Historically, though, as
well as practically, finality does seem to support the federalism and comity interests.
32. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 453 n.16 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Federal habeas
review creates friction between our state and federal courts. . . . Moreover, under our
federal system the States 'possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the
criminal law,' and 'hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights.
Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to
punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights."'). There
are a few additional interests that some scholars suggest have historically supported the
finality doctrine, including a presumption of correctness of the directly reviewed (or
final) verdict, see Berger, supra note 28, at 110, "encourag[ing] counsel to try their case
correctly the first time," David Lazer & Michelle N. Meyer, DNA and the Criminal justice
System: Consensus and Debate, in DNA & THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 28, at
357, 358, and improving the quality ofjudging, see Calderon, 523 U.S. at 555 ("Finality also
enhances the quality of judging."); Bator, supra note 8, at 451 ("I could imagine nothing
more subversive of a judge's sense of responsibility, of the inner subjective
conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the difficult and subtle art ofjudging well,
than an indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that all the shots will always be called by
someone else."). Moreover, there may be a psychological benefit to society inherent in
preserving finality-the notion that justice has been done. See Bator, supra note 8, at
452-53; Friendly, supra note 8, at 149. It should be noted, however, that some scholars
distinguish between the finality interests relevant in the capital and non-capital contexts.
See, e.g., Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and Collateral
Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 82 (2012) (excepting capital cases from her finality analysis).
33. See Berger, supra note 28, at 109 (asserting that vacated convictions require a
reassessment of our criminal justice system and "the value of finality in criminal
proceedings").
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convictions that is fostered by cases like Herrera.4 Since 1989,
there have been at least 1,326 wrongful convictions.3 5 And the
number of people who have been exonerated and released from
death row since 1973 is 143.3' With this large number of
wrongfully convicted individuals, there is considerable concern
that even more individuals are being unjustifiably incarcerated, or
even executed.
A number of these troubling exonerations have sprung
from scientific advances-especially developments related to DNA
technology.3 7  Scientific knowledge in this area has grown
tremendously since the 1980s and has allowed for more certain
evidence regarding innocence and guilt.38 Accordingly, much of
this advanced DNA technology was unavailable to some
defendants when they were convicted and was still unavailable
34. See id. at 112 ("Undoubtedly, the demonstration that numerous defendants were
wrongfully convicted has made the most dramatic inroad into the case for finality,
especially as a significant percentage of the convictions that have been vacated related to
inmates who were on death row."); Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1629, 1631, 1636 (2008) ("DNA technology has eroded the twin pillars
[of] . . . reliability and finality."); Lazer & Meyer, supra note 32, at 358 ("Few individuals
disagree with the principle that unambiguous evidence of innocence should be grounds
for exoneration."); see also supra text accompanying notes 10-17 (briefly outlining the
Herrera case). One can also see the Court cutting back on finality in its recent
postconviction cases, such as its 2013 opinion of McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924
(2013), in which the Court suggested that "actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway
through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural
bar . . . or . .. expiration of the statute of limitations." Id. at 1928. (The Court actually
phrased this statement as its holding, see id., but the Court ultimately found that "the
District Court's appraisal of [Defendant's] petition as insufficient to meet [the] actual-
innocence standard should be dispositive, absent cause, which we do not currently see, for
the Sixth Circuit to upset that evaluation," id. at 1936. This suggests that the Court's
alleged holding that actual innocence is a path around AEDPA's statute of limitations is
actually dictum.).
35. See NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exon
eration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visitedJune 23, 2013).
36. See The Innocence List, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.o
rg/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last visitedJune 23, 2013).
37. See Garrett, supra note 34, at 1630-33.
38. See id. at 1658-59 (explaining that scientific advancements in the 1990s-such as
polymerase chain reaction ("PCR") testing, short tandem repeat ("STR") testing, and
mitochondrial DNA testing-contributed to an increase in the rate of DNA
exonerations); see also Lisa Calandro et al., Evolution of DNA Evidence for Crime Solving - A
judicial and Legislative History, FORENSIC MAGAZINE (Jan. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.forensicmag.com/articles/2005/01/evolution-dna-evidence-crime-solving-jud
icial-and-legislative-history ("Even though DNA testing would grow more ubiquitous in the
criminal justice system over its first fifteen years in use, another wave of cases came with
advancements in DNA testing technology.").
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when they initially challenged their convictions on collateral
review. Several scholars argue that the greater certainty that DNA
evidence and other scientific advancements can provide suggests
that the age-old doctrine of finality, which could prevent these
defendants from making use of such evidence, has little relevance
anymore.3 9 Their primary argument attacks the government's
punitive interest in finality40 : Whereas eyewitness identifications
are often mistaken,4 1  defendants' confessions are frequently
false,42 and certain physical evidence can lead to erroneous
conclusions,43 DNA evidence is generally thought to be the most
reliable evidence available in a criminal case 44-and this evidence
39. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 34, at 1636 ("DNA technology has eroded the twin
pillars supporting the Court's ruling in Herrera: reliability and finality."); Cynthia E. Jones,
Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of Biological Evidence Under Innocence
Protection Statutes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1239, 1266 (2005) ("While the government's
interest in finality of judgments is strong enough to block some post-conviction petitions
for review, that interest should be significantly weaker when asserted in the context of
petitions for post-conviction DNA testing."); Lazer & Meyer, supra note 32, at 359 ("Most
would now agree that DNA constitutes an exception to the principle of finality.").
40. See Lazer & Meyer, supra note 32, at 359; supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
41. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) ("The vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of
mistaken identification."); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 411 (5th ed.
2009) (" [It is well known that eyewitness evidence is inherently suspect. . . ."); Elizabeth
F. Loftus, Make-Believe Memories, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 867, 867-73 (2003) (summarizing some
of the research related to mistaken eyewitness identifications); Eyewitness Misidentification,
THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-
Misidentification.php (last visited Mar. 3, 2014) ("Eyewitness misidentification is the
single greatest cause of wrongful convictions nationwide, playing a role in nearly 75% of
convictions overturned through DNA testing.").
42. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REv. 891, 920-21 (2004) (stating that "[false] confessions occur
with alarming frequency" and that "interrogation-induced false confession may be a
bigger problem for the American criminal justice system than ever before"); False
Confessions, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Fals
e-Confessions.php (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (attributing approximately 25% of
wrongfully convicted individuals who were exonerated by DNA evidence to false
confessions).
43. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE
IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) (highlighting troubling deficiencies in
many forensic science disciplines and techniques); Jonathan J. Koehler, Fingerprint Error
Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They Are and Why They Matter, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1077 (2008)
(casting doubt on the reliability of fingerprint evidence); Ryan, Wrongful Execution, supra
note 18, at 264-72 (explaining how the questionable application of arson science may
have led to Cameron Todd Willingham's wrongful execution in Texas).
44. See Tonja Jacobi & Gwendolyn Carroll, Acknowledging Guilt: Forcing Self-
Identification in Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 263, 270-71 (2008) ("DNA
testing is viewed as some of the most concretely verifiable evidence of identification
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is even said to improve with time as science and technology
improve.4 5 Accordingly, they argue, if DNA evidence was not
available in a defendant's original case, the passage of time has
actually made it easier, rather than more difficult, to determine
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 46
In addition to discounting the government's punitive
interests that would weigh against revisiting a defendant's
conviction, scholars have argued that other finality interests are
similarly irrelevant in this context. For example, it has been
argued that there is no role for deterrence if the defendant can
make a showing of his innocence, because continuing to punish
an innocent man and allowing the guilty one to go free actually
undermines the value of deterrence.4 ' Also, scholars have
responded to the argument that cutting back on the finality
doctrine and opening the courts to claims based on, for example,
later-analyzed DNA evidence, will result in a flood of otherwise
unjusticiable claims.48 While acknowledging that some financial
costs would be involved with such a change in the finality doctrine,
scholars contend that the concern is largely overblown.49
available to the courts .... ); Ryan, Wrongful Execution, supra note 18, at 274 ("Perhaps
the only way to persuasively establish innocence is through DNA evidence."). But cf Ryan,
Wrongful Execution, supra note 18, at 274 n.89 (" [W] hile DNA evidence can be 'uniquely
probative' of a defendant's innocence, it is not conclusive. For example, the defendant
may not have left behind any of his DNA, and the trace DNA evidence examined could
belong to his partner or an innocent individual." (internal citations omitted)).
45. See Berger, supra note 28, at 111 ("One assumption on which the belief in finality
rests-that the passage of time will undermine the accuracy of a criminal adjudication-is
completely refuted by DNA testing."); id. at 113 ("Unlike the memory of witnesses, DNA
does not fade away."); see also NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA
TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP 15 (2000),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/183697. pdf ("DNA is remarkably stable,
as is evidenced by its being identified long after death, for example, in Egyptian mummies
or even extinct mammoths."). Several scholars base their arguments for the lesser need
for finality in the age of DNA evidence on this notion that the evidence improves with
time because technology improves with time. Many of them fail to address the related
issue of the degradation of DNA evidence over time. See Richard A. Nakashima, DNA
Evidence in Criminal Trials: A Defense Attorney's Primer, 74 NEB. L. REV. 444, 468 (1995)
("Degradation of DNA can occur spontaneously over time."); Ryan, Wrongful Execution,
supra note 18, at 274.
46. See Berger, supra note 28, at 113.
47. See Garrett, supra note 34, at 1704 ("One concern not discussed by the Court in
Herrera is deterrence. This omission is unsurprising, however, for deterrence itself is
undermined when the innocent continue to be punished while the guilty go free.").
48. See Berger, supra note 28, at 115; Lazer & Meyer, supra note 32, at 359.
49. See Berger, supra note 28, at 115; Lazer & Meyer, supra note 32, at 359 (" [T]here
is little evidence that increased access to postconviction testing would drain resources
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Moreover, the exonerations that would likely result from a relaxed
or nonexistent finality doctrine, it is argued, would actually save
money, as the government would no longer have to house, feed,
clothe, and medicate those who do not belong in prison.5 0
Scholars have also argued that the finality doctrine actually does
not provide the same closure to victims as it once did.5 1 Instead,
DNA testing made available even after a significant amount of
time has passed is said to provide victims with greater closure
because it provides confirmation that the real offender has been
convicted and punished, and it will also supposedly put an end to
the defendant's legal challenges.5 2  Further, scholars have
suggested that comity and federalism concerns are similarly
weakened in this context because states, themselves, have
abandoned finality by adopting post-conviction DNA testing
statutes.5 3 Notably, however, scholars have largely neglected to
examine the continued relevance of finality in promoting
offender rehabilitation in the conviction context. Perhaps this
should not be surprising, because scholars have generally
discounted the significance of rehabilitation since the theory
faded from the penal landscape in the mid-1970s.54
III. FINALITY IN SENTENCING
In recent years, courts and scholars have been considering
how the doctrine of finality applies to sentencing.5 5 There are at
from the criminal justice system."); cf Garrett, supra note 34, at 1704 (" [T]he number of
meritorious innocence claims will not be high.").
50. See Lazer & Meyer, supra note 32, at 359 (noting that "housing an inmate costs
anywhere from $16,000 to $25,000 annually, while [DNA] testing costs from $50 to $5,000
per case, including materials and personnel expenses").
51. See Berger, supra note 28, at 113-14.
52. See id. at 114. In some circumstances, though, DNA analysis may provide
inconclusive results, and thus not provide this desired closure. See Garrett, supra note 34,
at 1650 ("DNA test results can be inconclusive if insufficient biological material remained,
or if what remained was degraded."); see also supra note 45 (noting that DNA samples may
degrade with time).
53. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 34, at 1702-03 (suggesting that federalism concerns
are not a valid finality interest in the context of actual innocence claims because most
states have abandoned the finality interest by providing for postconviction DNA testing).
54. See Ryan, Science and Rehabilitation, supra note 1, at 11-16; see also infra text
accompanying note 115.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 18-32; see also, e.g., Gilbert v. United States,
640 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ("The principles of policy that limit the
right to be resentenced in accord with the latest guidelines decisions are those regarding
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least two situations in which the question of whether to reexamine
offenders' sentences arise. The first is in determining whether
courts should collaterally review sentences for legal errors, and the
second is whether courts should resentence offenders based on
changed views of disproportionate punishment." In examining
these situations, courts and scholars have focused on some of the
same interests underlying the finality doctrine as in the conviction
context: the government's punitive interests, deterrence, offender
rehabilitation,57 conservation of governmental resources, victim
closure, and comity and federalism.58 Even beyond looking at
these particular interests supporting the finality doctrine, scholars
seem to be influenced by other, broader, considerations.
Examining the issue through a lens of perceived enlightenment
and compassion for the criminal offender, they seem to suggest
that weakening the finality doctrine will further offender
rehabilitation and allow for criminal sentences to better comport
with our evolved understandings ofjust punishment.
A. Legal Errors in Sentencing
The question of legal errors in sentencing has recently
kindled a movement to revisit offender sentences. This comes in
the wake of a series of cases in which it was discovered that some
lower courts had inappropriately enhanced offenders' sentences
based on their misreading of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines'
"Career Offender" provision. 59 This provision states that an
offender's sentence should be enhanced if, among other
requirements, the offender had previously committed a "crime of
violence."o In 2008, though, the Supreme Court decided the
finality of judgment and the important interests that finality promotes."); Russell, supra
note 32, at 139-62 (analyzing the applicability of finality interests in the context of
sentencing).
56. These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
57. But, as explained above, rehabilitation is regularly ignored in recent analyses of
how strong the finality doctrine should apply to convictions.
58. See Russell, supra note 32, at 145-55.
59. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2013); see also, e.g., Gilbert,
640 F.3d 1293 (en banc) (acknowledging that a legal error was involved in sentencing the
defendant but refusing to overturn the resulting erroneous sentence).
60. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2013). The Career Offender
provision states that an offender may be sentenced more harshly-by raising his offense
level and his criminal history category-if he "was at least eighteen years old at the time
[he] committed the . . . offense," the offense "is a felony that is either a crime of violence
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Begay v. United States1 case, in which the Court determined that an
analogous phrase62 in the Armed Career Criminal Act should be
interpreted more narrowly than several lower courts had been
doing.6' Accordingly, it has become apparent that several
offenders have been erroneously considered career offenders
under the Guidelines, leaving them serving longer sentences than
they actually should have received.64 For example, in 1996, Ezell
Gilbert pled guilty to one count of possession of crack cocaine
with intent to distribute and one count of possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute.6' Based on his prior convictions of a
controlled substance offense and carrying a concealed firearm,
Gilbert was deemed a career offender and was thus sentenced
under the relevant Guidelines' enhancement.66 Based on this
enhancement, Gilbert was sentenced to 292 months' (twenty-four
and one-third years') imprisonment." Gilbert's initial attempts to
or a controlled substance offense," and the offender "has at least two prior felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." Id.
61. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
62. See United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1145 (10th Cir. 2010) (" [In
interpreting 'crime of violence' under § 4B1.2, we may look for guidance to cases
construing the [Armed Career Criminal Act's] parallel provision."); United States v. Tyler,
580 F.3d 722, 724 n.3 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that the Eighth Circuit "employ[s] the same
test to [determine whether an offense constitutes a 'violent felony' as it does to] decide
whether an offense constitutes a 'crime of violence' under the Sentencing Guidelines
because the definitions of 'violent felony' and 'crime of violence' are virtually identical");
United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that "the definition
of a 'violent felony' under . . . the Armed Career Criminal Act as 'Virtually identical' to the
definition of a 'crime of violence' under U.S.S.G. § 4B1 .2" and that Begay "clearly set forth
a new standard to evaluate which crimes constitute 'violent felonies' and 'crimes of
violence"').
63. Begay, 553 U.S. at 148 (holding that the New Mexico crime of driving under the
influence is not a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act); see also, e.g.,
United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 972 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a "felony
conviction for driving while intoxicated" constitutes a violent felony under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (emphasis omitted)), overruled by Begay, 553 U.S. 137; United States v.
Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706, 708-09 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that "circuits are divided on the
question whether . . . felony drunk driving is a 'violent felony' under [the Armed Career
Criminal Act]," and concluding that it is), overruled by Begay, 553 U.S. 137.
64. See Russell, supra note 32, at 81; see also, e.g., Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1324 (stating
that, " [a]fter a case has passed the stage of a first [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 proceeding, the right
to error correction is narrowly limited by principles of policy that reside in the finality of
judgment neighborhood of the law" and thus concluding that the defendant must serve
the erroneously-determined sentence).
65. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1298.
66. See id. at 1299.
67. See id. at 1300. "The district court sentenced Gilbert to 292 months[']
imprisonment on the intent to distribute crack cocaine count . . . . The court also
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appeal and collaterally attack his conviction and sentence were
unsuccessful." After the Supreme Court decided Begay in 2008,
Gilbert sought to "reopen and amend" his collateral attack on his
sentence because it had been determined that a critical basis of his
career offender enhancement-carrying a concealed firearm-was
actually not a "crime of violence."6 9 And had this enhancement
not been employed, the applicable Guidelines range would have
been just 151 to 188 months' (approximately twelve and one-half
to fifteen and one-half years') imprisonment, rather than 292
months' (twenty-four and one-third years') imprisonment.o
However, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 ("AEDPA") places significant restrictions on filing second
and successive motions for collateral relief." Because Gilbert had
already collaterally attacked his sentence prior to the Begay
decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that he was not entitled to
relief for his improperly imposed sentence. 2 The court's concern
for the doctrine of finality clinched its decision." The court stated
that finality interests are "critically important" and are
safeguarded by the limitations set forth in AEDPA.74 Allowing
Gilbert to proceed, the court explained, "would wreak havoc on
the finality interests that Congress worked so hard to protect with
sentenced Gilbert to 120 months['] imprisonment on the intent to distribute marijuana
count, to run concurrently." Id.
68. See id. at 1300-01. Gilbert filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court,
which was denied. See id. at 1301.
69. See id. at 1301-02.
70. Id. at 1300.
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2006). Section 2255(h) provides:
A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section
2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain-(1)
newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found
the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court, that was previously unavailable.
Id.
72. See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1295. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the text of the
statute precluded it from entertaining Gilbert's claim. See id. at 1307-09.
73. See id. at 1309-12 ("The critically important nature of the finality interests
safeguarded by [AEDPA] also weighs heavily against an interpretation of the [statute] that
would lower the second or successive motions bar and permit guidelines-based attacks
years after the denial of an initial § 2255 motion.").
74. Id. at 1309.
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the AEDPA provisions" 5 : "If second and successive motions are
not 'greatly restricted,' there will be no end to collateral attacks on
convictions and sentences, and there will be no finality of
judgment."" Emphasizing this point, the court referenced some
of the same interests that courts have cited in the conviction
context-confidence in the criminal justice system, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and comity and federalism." It concluded that, "for
claims of sentence error, at least where the statutory maximum was
not exceeded, the point where finality holds its own against error
correction is reached not later than the end of the first round of
collateral review." 8
Despite the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning, scholars have
suggested that the traditional interests underlying the finality
doctrine have significantly less relevance in the sentencing
context.79 For example, the government's punitive interests may
not be at stake in the same way as in the conviction context
because the offender's punishment, rather than his underlying
conviction, is at issue; "records of convictions do not go 'stale' in
the way that witnesses and some types of physical evidence may,""
and the passage of time can actually improve the amount of
information available about the offender-by, for example,
providing evidence of rehabilitation-allowing judges to better
determine an appropriate sentence after more time has passed.8 1
Additionally, one scholar has argued that there is no real interest
in deterrence here.82  Because swiftness and certainty of
punishment have a greater deterrent effect than the severity of
punishment,83 revisiting an offender's sentence with an eye
towards shortening it will have no appreciable detrimental effect
75. Id. at 1310.
76. Id. at 1311.
77. See id. at 1310-11.
78. Id. at 1312.
79. Russell, supra note 32, at 145.
80. Id. at 153. This is similar to the argument that DNA evidence renders the finality
doctrine significantly less important in the conviction context. See supra text
accompanying notes 39-54.
81. See Russell, supra note 32, at 153 (" [T]he passage of time could actually enhance
the court's ability to determine an appropriate sentence . . . [because] the court can
consider the defendant's conduct in prison . . . [including] the [defendant's]
extraordinary efforts at rehabilitation . . .
82. See id. at 154.
83. See Bator, supra note 8, at 452 n.21; Russell, supra note 32, at 154.
2014] 135
WAKE FOREST JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY
on deterrence goals. 8 4 Moreover, fewer governmental resources
are expended in resentencing an offender than in retrying him,
and governmental resources are actually saved if an offender is
released from governmental custody early." Also, resentencing an
offender has less of an impact on victims' senses of closure than
retrying an offender, because, when resentencing, the conviction
still stands.8 ' Further, at least when federal sentences are at issue,
such as is the case with Guidelines cases like Gilbert, concerns of
comity and federalism are irrelevant because only federal courts
are involved.8 ' Finally, the rehabilitative basis for finality may be
absent here. In fact, scholars have suggested that the finality
doctrine undercuts the rehabilitative enterprise-that the long
prison sentences that finality protects may actually "be counter-
productive to rehabilitation."8 8 Offenders subject to these unjust
punishments may have difficulty accepting their punishments and
therefore be unmotivated to work on their own personal growth.
B.Just Punishment in an Age of Enlightenment and
Rehabilitation
Beyond the concern for legal errors in sentencing,
commentators also seem to be troubled by a sense that
punishments imposed during earlier times are disproportionate to
the crimes for which they were imposed. Historically, legislatures'
and judges' determinations of appropriate sentences generally
have been afforded significant respect.89 But commentators are
84. Russell, supra note 32, at 154. Despite this argument, the severity of punishment
is still an accepted factor in deterrence, so the statement that there is no real interest in
deterrence in this context is likely hyperbole.
85. See id. at 146-52.
86. See id. at 155. Sarah French Russell has argued that the interest of victim closure
is less important in the resentencing context also because, upon resentencing, it is
unlikely that the offender will be released in the near future. See id. Moreover, many of
the offenses for which such sentencing may occur-such as drug crimes-lack a clear
victim anyway. See id.
87. See id. at 146.
88. Id. at 154-55. Moreover, one scholar has argued, federal law provides that a term
of imprisonment cannot be lengthened to serve rehabilitative goals. See id.
89. Outside of the capital context-and, more recently, the juvenile life-without-
parole context-courts have been extremely reluctant to strike down legislatively
sanctioned punishments. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding
a defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which was
imposed under a recidivist statute, for the crime of possessing more than 650 grams of
cocaine); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding a defendant's sentence of
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now suggesting that society has evolved and therefore the
punishments that have been legally imposed upon certain
offenders during a previous era are too stringent-that the
sentiments that led to these sentences are outdated and stale. 9 0
Since the time these punishments were imposed, they argue,
society's views have become more enlightened and perhaps more
understanding of the criminal offender's tribulations.9 1
One of the primary targets of commentators' interest in
relaxing finality is the long sentences that many scholars view as
draconian. 9 2 This especially seems to be the case in the context of
drug crimes. In 1982, President Reagan announced this country's
life imprisonment, which was imposed under a recidivist statute, for the crime of
obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses); cf Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)
(striking down a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile
offender who committed a homicide offense); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)
(striking down a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders
who committed non-homicide offenses). The historical pedigree ofjudicial discretion has
narrowed in recent years. See generally, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490
(2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt."); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (2004)
(setting advisory sentences for offenders with particular criminal histories who have
committed particular offenses).
90. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2012) (proposing second-look sentencing); Richard S. Frase, Second Look Provisions in the
Proposed Model Penal Code Revisions, 21 FED. SENT'G REP. 194 (2009) (concluding that
second-look sentencing provisions are essential); Margaret Colgate Love & Cecelia
Klingele, First Thoughts About "Second Look" and Other Sentence Reduction Provisions of the
Model Penal Code: Sentencing Revision, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 859 (2011) (explaining and
supporting second-look sentencing).
91. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2012); Frase, supra note 90; Love & Klingele, supra note 90.
92. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, Playing "21" With Narcotics Enforcement: A Response
to Professor Carrington, 52 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 937, 981 (1995) ("Even if one believes as I
do in the deterrent power of serious punishment, many drug sentences under the
guidelines are of lengths far longer than necessary to achieve maximum deterrence.");
Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City on a Hill". American Exceptionalism and the Supreme
Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1385 (2006) (describing this
nation's drug laws as "extremely draconian," at least by global standards, and explaining
that " [n] o other western democracy imprisons people so long for narcotics offenses");
Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and
Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 515 (2010) ("Against this backdrop of race, drugs, crime,
and welfare, Congress waged a 'war on drugs,' which resulted in harsh sentencing
schemes that have fallen overwhelmingly on African Americans and Latinos."); see
also Paul Butler, Retribution, for Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1873, 1881, 1884-88 (1999)
(stating that a common criticism of the American criminal justice system is that
" [s] entences for drug crimes are too severe" and arguing that such harsh punishments
are not proportionate to the drug offenders' deserts).
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"War on Drugs."9 3 Congress then passed several statutes that
sharply increased penalties for drug-related crimes-most notably
new mandatory minimum sentences.94 Many commentators find
these sentences unjustifiable. 95 For example, one professor has
lamented that these laws "are indefensibly rigid, often unfair and
unjustly harsh."96 These long sentences for drug offenders have
led many commentators to blame the War on Drugs for prison
overcrowding and the resulting suffocating costs of increasing
93. See Robert G. Lawson, Drug Law Reform-Retreating from an Incarceration Addiction,
98 KY. L.J. 201, 201 (2010) ("The so-called 'war on drugs' was officially declared by
President Reagan in 1982, although it had started earlier under the pressure of public
concerns about drug abuse."); David M. Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy:
Learning Lessons from Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines Era, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1, 9-10 (2008) ("At the start of the Sentencing Guidelines Era, the Reagan
Administration declared a federal 'War on Drugs' and stressed the importance of
increasing drug and gun prosecutions and issued tougher plea policies that called for
more severe sentences."); see also Michael M. O'Hear, Federalism and Drug Control,
57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 799 (2004) (explaining that Reagan's declaration was a "renewed
'war on drugs"').
94. See Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the United States
and the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261, 287-88 (2010) (describing the growth of the
"war on drugs"); cf. Kimberl6 W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration:
Thinking Intersectionally about Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1439-
40 (2012) ("The racial dimensions of the war, particularly the crack-powder cocaine
distinctions and the draconian mandatory minimums, have been well documented.").
95. See Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a
Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1132 (2001) ("There are
doubtless a good number of judges, probation officers, and lawyers who feel strongly that
the Guidelines, strictly applied, produce drug sentences so long as to be unjust, either
generally or at least frequently."); Gabrielle S. Friedman et al., Challenging the Guidelines'
Loss Table, 20 FED. SENT'G REP. 3, 174 (2008) (noting district court judges' concern "that
unmediated application of the Guidelines drug table may lead to unjustly long sentences
for some nonviolent narcotics offenders"); see also, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Race, Trust,
Altruism, and Reciprocity, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1001, 1061 (2005) ("Long sentences for mere
possession or small sales of drugs diminish respect for law among the many people who
consider these sentences unjust."); David C. Leven, Our Drug Laws Have Failed-So M~ere
Is the Desperately Needed Meaningful Reform?, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 293 (2000) ("Our
current drug laws often impose harsh sentences on low level offenders-many of whom
are serving draconian sentences for non-violent crimes-while drug trafficking and use
have continued virtually unabated."); Jonathan T. Menitove, The Problematic Presidential
Pardon: A Proposal for Reforming Federal Clemency, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 447, 454 (2009)
(referring to the "unjustly long prison sentences" than many federal offenders must
serve); Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory
Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87,
98 (2003) (" [W]hatever the systemic impact, federal narcotics sentences simply are too
long.").
96. Weinstein, supra note 95, at 126.
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incarceration. 97 While other legal scholars refute this relationship
between drug enforcement and prison overcrowding, 9 8 the focus
on this connection has likely contributed to scholars' discontent
with long prison sentences.
More radical than commentators simply scoffing at
draconian drug laws, drafters of a new tentative revision of the
Model Penal Code ("MPC") have suggested several changes to
undermine the historical finality in sentencing. They have
proposed allowing judges to decrease imposed sentences by up to
30% based on offenders' accumulation of good time and earned
time credits. 99 They have suggested that judges adjust sentences to
accommodate compassionate releases-those based on an
offender's disability, illness, or significant change in family
circumstances.1 00 And perhaps most revolutionarily, the drafters
have proposed judicial reconsideration of sentences based upon
social change-"second look" sentencing.10 1 The reasoning
behind this proposal is that, as society changes and evolves,
97. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 59 (2010) ("Convictions for drug offenses are the single
most important cause of the explosion in incarceration rates in the United States.");
MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 34-37 (1999) (concluding that, in the federal
system, "drug offenses alone account[ed] for three fourths (74 pe[r]cent) of the rise in
the inmate population between 1985 and 1995").
98. See, e.g., John F. Pfaff, The Empirics of Prison Growth: A Critical Review and Path
Forward, 98J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547, 559 (2008) (" [Tihe effect of the war on drugs
on overall prison populations is often overstated. Despite large numbers of arrests,
relatively few drug offenders are sent to prison."); Franklin E. Zimring, The Scale of
Imprisonment in the United States: Twentieth Century Patterns and Twenty-First Century Prospects,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1225, 1237-38 (2010) ("To the extent . . . that the
relatively constant growth of imprisonment before and after the peak emphasis on the war
on drugs indicates that drug offenders simply crowded out marginal property offenders or
restrained longer prison sentences for street criminals when they took priority in the late
1980s, the drug panic was not itself a primary cause of change in the growth rate of
imprisonment."); cf Jesse J. Norris, The Earned Release Revolution: Early Assessments and
State-Level Strategies, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1551, 1624 (2012) ("Studies demonstrate that
increases in prison admissions, not the length of sentences, were overwhelmingly the
main cause behind the growing incarceration rates of the 1990s.").
99. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012).
100. See id. § 305.7.
101. See id. § 305.6. This proposal suggests that legislatures "authorize a judicial panel
or other judicial decisionmaker to hear and rule upon applications for modification of
sentence from prisoners who have served 15 years of any sentence of imprisonment." Id.
"Sentence modification under this provision should be viewed as analogous to a
resentencing in light of present circumstances. The inquiry shall be whether the purposes
of sentencing . . . would better be served by a modified sentence than the prisoner's
completion of the original sentence." Id.
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perhaps it makes sense to reexamine criminal sentences imposed
during earlier harsher times and allow offenders to benefit from
our now enlightened views.1 02 The drafters' commentary to this
new proposal provides:
The passage of many years can call forward every
dimension of a criminal sentence for possible
reevaluation. On proportionality grounds, societal
assessments of offense gravity and offender
blameworthiness sometimes shift over the course of
a generation or comparable periods. In recent
decades, for example, there has been flux in
community attitudes toward many drug offenses,
homosexual acts as criminal offenses, and even
crime categories as grave as homicide, such as when
a battered spouse kills an abusive husband, or cases
of euthanasia and assisted suicide. . . . It would be
an error of arrogance and ahistoricism to believe
that the criminal codes and sentencing laws of our
era have been perfected to reflect only timeless
values. The prospect of evolving norms, which
might render a proportionate prison sentence of
one time period disproportionate in the next, is a
small worry for prison terms of two, three, or five
years, but is of great concern when much longer
confinement sentences are at issue.103
While differences in opinion about the moral disapprobation to
be placed on various transgressions have long been recognized in
criminal law,1 04 and while opinions on the sentence that an offense
102. See id.
103. Id. § 305.6 cmt b.
104. See MeghanJ. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOuS. L. REV. 1049, 1064-65 (2012)
("While numerous empirical studies demonstrate that individuals across cultures
generally agree on the relative, or ordinal, ranking of standard criminal offenses, there
seems to be little agreement as to the cardinal ranking-or the weighted sequencing-of
these offenses."). See also generally Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and
Conflict in Intuitions ofJustice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1847 (2007) (explaining that
individuals' judgments about the severity of crimes can measurably vary, although
concluding that the differences in opinion on this issue have been overstated).
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merits may change over time,1 0 the notion that judges should
alter sentences based on only society's change in opinion about
what type of sentence is appropriate for a particular crime is a
radical departure from prior approaches to sentencing in this
country.1 06 It challenges the important role that finality has long
played in sentencing decisions by allowing reconsideration of an
offender's sentence after he has served only part of it.107
This significant change from prior approaches to finality
and sentencing seems to grow from our generation's perceived
enlightenment. As the drafters of the proposed MPC provision
explained, "societal assessments of offense gravity and offender
blameworthiness sometimes shift over the course of a
generation." 08 As a result, the drafters suggest that sentences
ought to be examined in light of these new, evolved, societal
assessments. 109 Along with our confidence in the power of DNA
evidence that has revealed the wrongfulness of hundreds of
convictions, 110 we seem to be confident that we are not as blinded
by fear and vengeance as our predecessors and can instead make
better determinations of proportionate and just punishment.
IV. FINALITY AND REHABILITATION
What has set the stage for this fresh confidence of our
generation? Of course it is difficult to know, but it seems to be the
105. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012)
("On proportionality grounds, societal assessments of offense gravity and offender
blameworthiness sometimes shift over the course of a generation or comparable periods.
In recent decades, for example, there has been flux in community attitudes
toward ... drug offenses, homosexual acts as criminal offenses, and even crime categories
as grave as homicide . . . .").
106. See Love & Klingele, supra note 90, at 861 (explaining that this proposal "offers a
new model" of sentencing); Kevin R. Reitz, Demographic Impact Statements, O'Connor's
Warning, and the Mysteries of Prison Release: Topics from a Sentencing Reform Agenda, 61 FLA.
L. REv. 683, 704 (2009) (explaining that a recent draft of the MPC "addresses ... a novel
mechanism for ajudicial 'second look'-a power of sentence modification-deep into the
execution of long-term prison sentences (which would have been a wholly new proposal
not based on prior state or federal law)").
107. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012). The
proposal suggests that offenders' sentences may be revisited after the offender has served
at least fifteen years of his sentence of imprisonment. Id.
108. Id. § 305.6 cmt b; see also supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
109. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2012).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 33-46.
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same sentiment held by the policymakers and commentators of
the mid-1900s who enthusiastically embraced rehabilitation."
Rehabilitation came of age in America in the late eighteenth
century when, spurred on by the Quakers, the government sought
to reform offenders' characters through segregation from corrupt
influences, hard labor, and religious instruction.112 In the 1950s
and 1960s, rehabilitation proliferated as great strides were made in
psychiatry and related fields.113 One might consider recent
advances in pharmacology, genetics, and neuroscience to mirror
these mid-century developments.1 14 Indeed, the same recent DNA
technology that has led to the unearthing of hundreds of wrongful
convictions is a prime example of such scientific progress. It is also
an example of how new scientific knowledge can breed the
confidence that our generation is currently exhibiting in the
criminal justice realm. Just as with those now questioning the
finality of convictions and sentencing, policymakers at the time
that rehabilitation was proliferating were convinced that they
knew better than their predecessors, who had not seen the full
potential of offender rehabilitation.
The rehabilitative movement of the 1900s abruptly fizzled
out in the mid-1970s.11 5 This was due primarily to the concern that
rehabilitation simply did not work,"' but the theory also abated
because it was thought that it caused similar offenders to be
treated unequally, implemented race and class biases, bred
111. See Francis A. Allen, Criminal justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226, 227 (1959) (" [I1n no other period has the rehabilitative
ideal so completely dominated theoretical and scholarly inquiry. . . ."); Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Consideration Transforms an Old
Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 136 (2010) ("By the mid-1960s, retributive justifications
for punishment had fallen from favor and rehabilitation was widely embraced as a
respectable if not urgent penological goal."). Rehabilitation was later reviled by
policymakers and scholars who instead overwhelmingly embraced retribution as the
primary theory of punishment. See Ryan, Science and Rehabilitation, supra note 1, at 8
n.25; infra text accompanying notes 115-17.
112. See Ryan, Science and Rehabilitation, supra note 1, at 7-8.
113. See Allen, supra note 111, at 226; Ryan, Science and Rehabilitation, supra note 1,
at 9-10.
114. See Ryan, Science and Rehabilitation, supra note 1, at 30-31.
115. See id. at 11-13.
116. See id. at 10-11; cf. Robert Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About
Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974) (concluding that, "[w]ith few and isolated




judicial arbitrariness, and was too coercive."' Along with the
recent questioning of finality, though, rehabilitation has recently
been making a comeback." Evidencing this trend, several
legislatures have created specialty courts to support offender
treatment in the areas of mental illness and substance abuse, and
legislatures have also devoted resources to aiding in offender
reentry.1 19 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the
importance of rehabilitation in some of its recent Eighth
Amendment cases.1 20 For example, in its 2010 Graham v. Florida121
opinion, the Court held that a life-without-parole sentence for a
juvenile offender committing a non-homicide offense was
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.1 22 It explained that the
sentence of life without parole is inconsistent with the goal of
rehabilitation because it "forswears altogether the rehabilitative
ideal."1 23 "By denying the defendant the right to reenter the
community," the Court explained, "the State makes an irrevocable
judgment about that person's value and place in society." 124
Similarly, in its 2012 Miller v. Alabama'25 case, the Court held that
mandatory juvenile life-without-parole in homicide cases is
unconstitutional. 126 Again, the Court focused on the virtues and
importance of rehabilitation, stating that the "mandatory
punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when
the circumstances most suggest it."127 In both of these cases,
ignoring juveniles' potential for rehabilitation rendered the
117. See Ryan, Science and Rehabilitation, supra note 1, at 13-15.
118. See id. at 19-29. This comeback has been fueled, at least in part, by scientific
innovations in the fields of pharmaceuticals, genetics, and neuroscience. See id. at 19-44.
119. See id. at 27-29; see also, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 168/5, 15 (2007) (recognizing
that mental illness and substance abuse are significant contributors to crime, finding a
"critical need" to address these issues, and stating intent "to create specialized mental
health courts with the necessary flexibility to meet the problems of criminal defendants
with mental illnesses and co-occurring mental illness and substance abuse problems");
IND. CODE § 33-23-16-20 (2010) (setting forth the services that a problem-solving court
may provide, including education, case management, supervision, and rehabilitative
services).
120. See Ryan, Science and Rehabilitation, supra note 1, at 23-26.
121. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
122. See id. at 82.
123. Id. at 74.
124. Id.
125. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
126. See id. at 2469.
127. Id. at 2468.
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punishments unconstitutional.1 8  Considering this recent
reemergence of rehabilitation-and our accompanying thoughts
that, perhaps with the aid of science, we have greater knowledge
about how to better treat offenders-it is not surprising that
commentators are questioning the wisdom of sentences premised
on older ideas and, along with this, questioning the role of finality
in sentencing.
Rehabilitation's relationship to the doctrine of finality is
perplexing, though. Scholars have largely neglected exploring the
relationship between the two concepts, 29 just as scholars have
generally overlooked the theory of rehabilitation since it waned in
the mid-1970s. 130 Finality has historically been thought to promote
offender rehabilitation.131 It allows an offender the chance to set
aside his battle with the criminal justice system and instead focus
inward, on his own potential for change.132 Paradoxically, though,
this movement away from finality is now often considered to
further rehabilitative goals.133 Indeed, rehabilitation is now
commonly thought to be at complete odds with the doctrine of
finality: If there is no hope that a court will revisit an offender's
conviction or sentence, and thus no hope of escaping the
offender's reality of possibly long-term imprisonment or even
death, what incentive does the offender have to work on
rehabilitating himself? It may seem more likely that an offender
will fall into despondency and be unable to work on changing
himself for the better. 134 Moreover, one might argue that revisiting
an offender's sentence can lead to a more just punishment
because the government, at this later point in time, has greater
information about whether the offender has been working toward
128. See id. at 2469; Graham, 560 U.S. at 73-74.
129. Russell, supra note 32, at 149.
130. See, e.g., id. at 150 (" [T]he argument that the availability of collateral review of
sentencing errors delays a prisoner's rehabilitation is far from compelling."); Ryan,
Science and Rehabilitation, supra note 1, at 10-11.
131. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); supra
text accompanying notes 25-26.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
133. See Russell, supra note 32, at 156.
134. See Russell, supra note 32, at 161 (" [T] reating the sentence as final hardly fosters
the prisoner's rehabilitation. Rather, the failure of the court to correct [an erroneously
enhanced] sentence may cause the prisoner to feel angry and disrespected by society.").
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rehabilitation and whether he has been successful in that
respect.1 35
V. REHABILITATION AND FINALITY OF THE OFFENDER
To better understand the relationship between
rehabilitation and finality, one must look more deeply at
rehabilitation and realize that rehabilitation is really about
offender change. Is the offender who has been convicted and
sentenced capable of transformation-of metamorphosing into an
individual viewed as virtuous, law-abiding, or a productive member
of society-or is the offender a final product incapable of change
and remaining a threat to either himself or society? In a sense, this
could be considered as a third class of finality-the finality of the
offender himself. If there is no finality here, meaning that the
offender is capable of change, what sort of change is possible, and
what type of change does society desire? Only by understanding
the contours of rehabilitation can we negotiate its relationship to
the various classes of finality.
Teasing out the different goals of what we refer to as
"rehabilitation" is essential. Historically, rehabilitation focused on
changing an offender's character.136 In the early days, for
example, it was thought that removing an offender from his
corrupt surroundings and providing him with religious education
could aid in this enterprise.137 Emerging science and attendant
confidence in our abilities has brought changes in how we view
rehabilitation, though.13' Today, rehabilitation is most often
viewed as transforming an offender's behavior. 139 This could be
achieved by enticing the offender to behave with good-time credits
and the like, or through biochemical interventions such as the
administration of antipsychotic medication or chemical
castration.140
135. See id. at 152-53.
136. See Ryan, Science and Rehabilitation, supra note 1, at 7-8, 44-45.
137. See id.
138. See generally id. (arguing that rehabilitation is reemerging, that increased faith in
science is contributing to rehabilitation's reprise, and that the rehabilitation reemerging
differs from the rehabilitation that preceded it).
139. See id. at 44-46.
140. See id. at 31-32; PaulJ. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Parole, Good-Time Credits, and Crowded
Prisons: Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 11 (2013). In practice, it
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Perhaps the clearest example of this development in our
understanding of rehabilitation can be seen in the capital
context.14 1 Capital punishment was imposed in early America in
part because it was thought to promote rehabilitation. 142 It was
thought to encourage the offender to reflect upon his actions and
prepare himself for death in an attempt to secure salvation.1 43
Today, in contrast, the Supreme Court has stated time and time
again-with virtually no disagreement from legal
commentators144-that capital punishment is completely irrelevant
to rehabilitation. 145 Any suggested connection has been said to be
obviously wrong, 14 6 a "sad joke." 147 After all, how can an offender
be rehabilitated if he does not have the opportunity to reintegrate
may be difficult to disentangle character and behavioral change. After all, behavioral
change may sometimes be deemed the best measure of character change.
141. Capital punishment could be considered the primary example of a fourth type of
finality: finality of the punishment itself. See, e.g., Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732
(1998) ("[Tihe death penalty is unique 'in both its severity and its finality."' (internal
citation omitted)); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("Death is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in
its enormity.").
142. See Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1246
(2013) [hereinafter Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation] ("[D]eath was imposed in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to encourage an offender to repent and rehabilitate
himself."); cf. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 16-17 (2002)
("Capital punishment was ... understood in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to
facilitate the criminal's repentance.").
143. See BANNER, supra note 142, at 16; Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, supra note 142,
at 1247.
144. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (1994) (suggesting that
rehabilitation is "irrelevant ... in the death penalty debate"); Stephen Gillers, Deciding
Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 47 (1980) ("Rehabilitation is obviously inapplicable [in the
death penalty context]."). But see generally Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, supra note 142
(arguing that death is relevant to rehabilitation).
145. See Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, supra note 142, at 1243-45; see also, e.g.,
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) ("The penalty of death differs from all
other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. . . . It is unique in its
rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice." (quoting
Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring))); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272
(1980) (same).
146. See TUSHNET, supra note 144, at 2 (suggesting that rehabilitation is "irrelevant ...
in the death penalty debate"); Gillers, supra note 144, at 47 ("Rehabilitation is obviously
inapplicable [in the capital context].").
147. Lupe S. Salinas, Is It Time to Kill the Death Penalty?: A View from the Bench and the
Bar, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 39, 57 (2006) ("It would be a sad joke to say the death penalty
rehabilitates because the person that needs reformation receives no benefit.").
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into society but is instead being put to death?14 8 The change in our
view of rehabilitation has thus migrated from character change in
early America to today's focus on behavioral change-ensuring
that an offender can reintegrate into society after he has served his
sentence. 149
This shift in our understanding of rehabilitation likely
contributes to the confusing relationship between rehabilitation
and finality. When rehabilitation was first counted as one of the
interests served by finality of conviction,5 o it was likely the
rehabilitation of character that was contemplated." This would
explain the view that finality is necessary to achieve rehabilitation,
because an offender cannot begin working on himself until he has
understood his wrongdoing and decided to change himself for the
better. In contrast, the more modern view that finality actually
undercuts the goal of rehabilitation1 2 is more consistent with the
behavioral understanding of the penological theory.153 Perhaps we
can coax an offender into changing his behavior by offering him
incentives such as the possibility of parole or "second look"
sentencing.154
The move from viewing finality as bolstering
rehabilitation15 5  to viewing finality as undermining
rehabilitation15 6 does not seem to be rooted in new or differing
evidence about the effectiveness of rehabilitation. The
effectiveness of rehabilitation and the ideal conditions for
148. See Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, supra note 142, at 1245 ("At first blush, courts'
and scholars' conclusion that capital punishment is irrelevant to rehabilitation seems to
make sense: How can an offender be rehabilitated if he is being put to death?").
149. See Ryan, Science and Rehabilitation, supra note 1, at 44-46. Indicative of this
modern understanding of rehabilitation is the now well-accepted view that the
effectiveness of rehabilitation is best measured by recidivism-whether offenders commit
additional criminal offenses upon release. See Marguerite A. Driessen, Challenging the
Irrelevant Acquittal, 11 GEO. MASON L. REv. 331, 334 (2002) ("Recidivism is believed to be
an objective measure of whether an offender has truly been rehabilitated."); E. Lea
Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REv. 519, 577 (2012) ("Rates of
recidivism are often considered the most tangible and suitable outcome measures of
rehabilitative treatment . . . .").
150. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40.
154. Cf. supra text accompanying note 140.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
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achieving it have been debated throughout the ages."' Today,
there continues to be a lack of consensus as to the effectiveness of
rehabilitation, and there is a lack of empirical evidence as to
whether finality of conviction and sentencing actually contributes
to offender rehabilitation, or whether jettisoning the doctrine will
further offender rehabilitation. New, reliable data on
rehabilitation and its relationship to finality would be welcome
here. Existing evidence regarding rehabilitation generally does
not distinguish between character and behavioral reform. Of
course, such a distinction is often difficult to make in practice.'58
But, again, this distinction is essential to understanding whether
finality in conviction and sentencing supports rehabilitation, or,
rather, whether it undercuts it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sorting out these various aspects of finality and
rehabilitation is key to understanding the relationship between
these intersecting legal precepts. In addition to the traditional
finality of conviction, scholars have recently been exploring the
doctrine of finality in the context of sentencing. Finality has been
historically understood to serve rehabilitative goals, but with the
recent faith in improved science, and attendant enlightened views
about offender treatment, finality has recently been said to
undercut rehabilitative goals. While this may seem paradoxical,
better understanding a third type of finality-the finality of the
offender-helps clarify these relationships. An offender can
potentially change in different ways. He may be able to reform his
character, and he may be able to alter his behavior. Providing an
offender with the opportunity to reflect on what he has done by
maintaining a strong finality doctrine of conviction and
sentencing may further an offender's character reform. But
relaxing or obliterating the doctrine of finality in the sentencing
context may promote behavioral change by providing the offender
157. There are some broad principles, though, as to what can effectively reduce
recidivism. It is thought that effective rehabilitation programs should "target the known
predictors of crime and recidivism for change," "should be behavioral in nature," and
should be used primarily with higher-risk offenders, targeting their criminogenic needs .
* . for change." FRANCIS T. CULLEN & CHERYL LERO JONSON, CORRECTIONAL THEORY:
CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES 165-69 (2012).
158. Indeed, behavioral change may sometimes be deemed the best measure of
character change. See supra note 140.
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with incentives and basic hope. Regardless of the breed of
rehabilitation at issue, and aside from the class of finality involved,
focus on the offender is essential as we attempt to negotiate the
best path forward in offender convictions, sentencing, and
rehabilitation.
